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Simple Shelters?
Monitoring Radioactive Fallout Across Canada, 1959-63
Andrew Burtch

D

uring the early Cold War, the
threat of nuclear war drove
many governments around the world
to urge their citizens to build fallout
shelters in which they could wait
out the deadliest period following
an attack. A thermonuclear bomb,
detonating at ground level, would
scatter intensely radioactive particles
hundreds of kilometres downwind of
the explosion. Numerous explosions
would blanket southern Canada with
fallout, which would kill millions
of citizens. Herman Kahn, the
RAND Corporation analyst whose
outspoken views formed the genesis
of Stanley Kubrick’s doomsday movie
Dr. Strangelove, drily commented in
his 1960 dissection of thermonuclear
war that “the radiation from fallout
has curious and frightening effects.”1
Ultimately, a high dose of radiation,
as observed by doctors and military
officials following the attacks on
Abstract: During the early Cold War,
the Canadian government advised the
public that they could cheaply build
fallout shelters in their homes to protect
their families from radiation after a
nuclear war. Publicly, the government
stayed out of the shelter-building
business, citing that the cost was too
high. However, from 1959 to the mid1960s, the Canadian Army secretly
constructed a network of 2,000 fallout
shelters in government buildings:
the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout
Reporting System. This article explores
the origins of this network and the
reasons for its decline.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
postwar nuclear tests, leads to a
prolonged breakdown of the body,
characterized by nausea, bleeding
gums, internal haemorrhaging, hair
loss, painful radiation burns, fever,
delirium, and death.2 In the postwar
period, civilian and military planners
hoped that the population would be
able to limit their exposure to the most
lethal doses of radioactivity after an
attack by taking shelter underground.
With fallout shelters, citizens could
possibly survive an attack, even if
they emerged to a destroyed world,
where increased risks of cancer,
birth defects, and widespread illness
would be the norm.3
Some governments, most notably
Sweden, invested large amounts of
money to dig massive communal
shelters to house tens of thousands
of citizens, and forced the housing
industry to include shelters in
every new building. The Canadian
government took a much less
interventionist route. In the late 1950s
and early 1960s, Prime Minister John
Diefenbaker, provincial premiers,
and local officials unsuccessfully
advised homeowners to build shelters
at their own expense. The Emergency
Measures Organization widely
distributed blueprints for a shelter
that homeowners could construct for
a cost of $500 (approximately $4,000
today). The accompanying designs
were meant to create the impression
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that safety was both simple and
reasonably affordable. The price,
nearly 10 percent of the average
Canadian income, was beyond the
means of most Canadians, however.
The federal government, for its
part, firmly stood by a position that
it could not afford to get into the
business of building fallout shelters
for millions of Canadians.
Yet at the same time, the federal
government became the largest
builder of fallout shelters in the
country, investing millions of dollars
in a secret crash program between
1959 and 1963. Some aspects of this
project were controversial, such as the
blast shelter in Carp, Ontario, meant
to house military and government
officials. A Toronto reporter who
Résumé : Au début de la guerre froide,
le gouvernement canadien a informé la
population qu’elle pouvait construire
à faible coût des abris antinucléaires
dans leur maison afin de protéger
leur famille d’éventuelles retombées
nucléaires après une guerre nucléaire.
Publiquement, le gouvernement s’est
tenu à l’écart de la construction de ces
abris en affirmant que le coût aurait été
trop élevé pour lui. Cependant, de 1959
au milieu des années 1960, l’Armée
canadienne a secrètement construit
un réseau de 2 000 abris antinucléaires
dans des immeubles gouvernementaux
: le Nuclear Detonation and Fallout
Re p o r t i n g S y s t e m ( s y s t è m e d e
déclaration de détonation nucléaire et
d’abris). Cet article explore les origines
de ce réseau et les raisons de son déclin.
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and cinderblock, of the
discovered the bunker
desperation of efforts
during its construction
to survive the Cold
gave it the nickname
War.
“Diefenbunker.” Much
The Canadian
to the embarrassment
military first entered
of the prime minister,
the shelter-building
the nickname stuck. 4
business as a result
Shelters like the
of two factors: the
Diefenbunker and
rapid progress of the
similar provincial
Cold War arms race,
sites were intended to
and the inability of
provide for continuity
federal, provincial, and
of government
local civilian defence
authority during a
agencies to keep pace
national crisis, but
with the changing
drew much public
threat to Canada.
criticism as evidence
Thermonuclear or
of a government’s
hydrogen bombs,
willingness to pursue
developed by the
self-preservation rather
superpowers in the
than national survival.
early 1950s, nullified
One Vancouver couple
the plans of civil
expressed their anger
defence agencies
about government
tasked with defending
shelters in a scathing
life and infrastructure.
letter to Diefenbaker in
Planners in Canada,
response to a televised
the United States,
civil defence exercise
and the United
in the spring of 1961:
Kingdom previously
“We sincerely hope
developed strategies
that neither you nor
that incorporated fireany Civil Servants with
fighting and rescue
access to Government
The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (above) ushered in a
principles tested
shelters will be found
new era in civil defence. The destructive potential of atomic weapons
during Second World
dead, trampled in the
forced the Canadian government to address the issue of protecting its
War bombing raids.
rush to the entrance
citizens in a manner that had previously never been considered.
Atomic weapons were
to the shelters, when
powerful enough to destroy parts of
those who got there first emerge in
unprepared for the complexity and
cities, but thermonuclear weapons
two weeks to mourn and bury the
difficulty of a project as seemingly
threatened to wipe out entire cities
rest of us.”5
simple as installing cinder-block
in a flash. The only solution civil
shelters in basements. The project
Less well-known than the
defence planners suggested was not
took three years, at a cost of over $3
Diefenbunker, but essential to the
to be there when the bomb went off.6
million, but even so the final results
government’s post-attack planning,
were significantly less substantial
was the Nuclear Detonation and
By 1954, Canadian officials began
than the military had originally hoped
Fallout Reporting System (NDFRS).
to plan for the evacuation of major
to achieve. The NDFRS provides
This network comprised more than
target cities within three hours of
an interesting case study of the
2,000 fallout shelters modelled on the
receiving an attack warning. These
challenges of emergency planning in
blueprints distributed to Canadian
arrangements included arrangements
peacetime and the politics of shelterfamilies, and installed secretly
to control traffic movement, allay
building in Canada. Remnants of
in government buildings across
public panic, billet and care for
the NDFRS are present in hundreds
the country. The Canadian Army
evacuees, but tended to ignore the
of communities across southern
hoped to have the network in place
lethal effects of radioactive fallout.
Canada, a material record, in mortar
quickly. The military was, however,
Without shelter, evacuees would
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survive the bomb but die from
radiation illness in the countryside.
The mushroom cloud resulting
from a thermonuclear explosion
would spread irradiated ash and dust
in the upper atmosphere, poisoning
the environment for hundreds
of kilometres downwind of the
explosion. Even if, as some planners
believed, the country escaped direct
attack, nuclear detonations in the
United States would still threaten
national survival. The Canadian
military recognized the risks posed
by thermonuclear weapons by
1954, but Canadian civilian defence
agencies, chronically underfunded
and divided among three levels of
government, fumbled for years to
find an effective solution before
settling on the family fallout shelter
as the best of the few options available
that might save lives. The situation
prompted a national review of civil
defence planning by retired chief
of the general staff LieutenantGeneral Howard Graham, who
recommended in late 1958 that the
armed forces should assume primary
responsibility for coordinating
national survival efforts, supported
by other government departments.
In May 1959, the federal cabinet
passed a Privy Council order that
incorporated many of Graham’s
recommendations. Among other
challenging tasks, the Canadian
Army was assigned the responsibility
to create and maintain an attack
warning system, detect nuclear
explosions, and monitor levels of
radioactive fallout over Canadian
territory. 7 These responsibilities
eventually brought the military
into the business of building fallout
shelters across the country.
Large government blast shelters
such as the Diefenbunker served two
purposes – to house key government
officials in order to ensure continuity
of government through an attack, and
to house a military communications
network capable of keeping links

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

open to different parts of the country
during the opening stages of a war.
Provincial and municipal shelters
were linked in to this network,
as were key military facilities in
Canada and the United States. The
trouble with the system as it was
originally devised was that, once
in the shelters, government officials
would be cut off from the outside
world. Without reliable reports
about local conditions, emergency
measures officials would be unable
to advise the public about when it
was safe to emerge from their home
fallout shelters and commence the
arduous process of rebuilding. The
Nuclear Detonation and Fallout
Reporting System (NDFRS) was
designed to serve as the eyes and ears
of the country.
Efforts to create the NDFRS
began in earnest in August 1959,
shortly after the Cabinet Committee
on Emergency Plans (CCEP)
approved the army’s plans for a
National Survival Attack Warning
System, the network of air raid sirens
installed across the country. The
Royal Canadian Air Force, the service
that was originally responsible for
radiation monitoring, developed
the original plans for the system
before the transfer of responsibility
to the army. 8 The army worked
with a study group composed of
representatives of the navy, air force,
Defence Research Board, and other
government agencies to develop
recommendations for Cabinet. This
group looked at what the United
Kingdom and the United States had
done to create a radiation monitoring
network. By early 1960, the British
had settled on plans to develop a
grid of 1,500 hardened fallout shelters
equipped with Geiger counters and
telephone lines that could report
radiation levels to the Home Office.
This system would be operated by
volunteer staffs and members of the
Ground Observer Corps, a volunteer
organization that had been created to

report suspicious aircraft movements
over the United Kingdom.9 In the
United States, different military and
government agencies at the federal,
state, and local levels had some
capability for radiation reporting.
The Office of Civil Defence and
Mobilization (OCDM) had, however,
proposed the creation of a Fixed
Federal Monitoring Network, where
fully automated, remotely-monitored
radiation sensors would be installed
on approximately 6,000 federal
government buildings to transmit
data from which OCDM could
determine fallout patterns.10
The Canadian study group,
observing the technological and
financial challenges posed by
developing an automated system
from scratch, looked to create
something closer to the British model
of shelters manned by volunteers.
They proposed two types of fallout
shelters. The first, nuclear detonation
reporting posts, would be established
around Canada’s main target cities:
Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary,
Edmonton, Winnipeg, Windsor,
London, Niagara Falls, Hamilton,
Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Québec,
Saint John, Halifax, and St. John’s.
Each city would be ringed with three
or more fallout shelters equipped with
specialized equipment to determine
the location and height of blasts, and
the approximate destructive power of
each bomb detonated over Canadian
territory.11 This information would
assist planners to determine the
extent of immediate casualties and
begin to predict fallout coverage.
The second, far more numerous type
of shelter, was the fallout reporting
post.
A Defence Research Board study
in 1956 had investigated the projected
shape of fallout clouds that would
form downwind after explosions
in Canada and the United States.
It determined approximately 2,000
posts would be required to effectively
monitor radiation intensity on the
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completion, to have all nuclear
forwarded its recommendations to
ground. The posts would need to be
detonation posts operational by 1 July
the CCEP, which gave approval in
situated in a grid south of the 55th
and all fallout posts ready to report
principle on 29 June 1960. 14 Then
parallel, with posts 15 miles apart
by 31 December 1961.15
on the north-south axis and 45 miles
began the slow and difficult task of
apart from east to west. The RCAF
actually building the system.
Area commands reported back
had adopted these findings as the
The work to move from the
to Army Headquarters with their
foundation for the national network
concept to actually breaking
results that spring. Each command
in its early planning work in 1959.12
ground on shelters took nearly two
carried out map studies to determine
years. Approval from the CCEP
suitable locations for fallout shelters
The Canadian Army built on these
did not immediately bring funds
throughout their areas, using
assumptions when finalizing plans
from the Treasury Board to pay for
existing federal buildings as much
for the system.
construction and materials. More
as possible. The process of mapping
To save money and speed
important, Cabinet approval did not
out where the shelters would go also
completion of the network, the Army
guarantee participation by provincial
resulted in greater scrutiny of the
recommended to Cabinet that shelters
or municipal government agencies,
possible weaknesses of the system.
could be installed in Department of
Major-General
National Defence
John Rockingham,
facilities, Royal
NUDET and FRP report to Filter Centre or direct to provincial
commander of
Canadian Mounted
bunkers
Quebec Command,
Police detachments,
noted that most
Department of
of the proposed
Transport weather
Filter Centres collate data from outposts, send reports
shelters would use
stations, provincial
to federal and provincial emergency government bunkers
existing civilian
police stations and
communications
Lands and Forests
Emergency
government
headquarters
staff
plot
lines. Most of
departments, as
nuclear detonations and fallout patterns
these ran through
well as in railway
M o n t r e a l ’ s
stations. 13 A brief
main exchange.
survey had revealed
Air raid sirens and emergency radio broadcasts inform
public
when
to
emerge
from
shelter
or
evacuate
M o n t r e a l ’ s
that using these
destruction would
sites alone could
therefore cripple
account for nearly
fallout reporting
three-quarters of
Figure 1: Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting
and national
the national grid,
System (NDFRS) Communications
survival efforts
covering everything
in Quebec. Even if Montreal was
let alone outside partners like the
from the urban core of target areas to
spared the direct effects of attack,
national rail systems, whose support
the sparsely populated countryside.
no provision had been made to
had to be solicited. Most ready to
The detonation and fallout
provide fallout shelters for
cooperate was the military. The
reporting posts would communicate
civilian switchboard operators, so
newly-formed Directorate of Survival
their findings to filter centres, falloutcommunications would still be nonOperations and Plans presented the
protected regional facilities located
existent. Resolving this problem
concept to the area commanders
in federal properties, which would
would require the introduction of
responsible for the Army’s operations
verify post reports and forward them
military communications outlets in
within Canada in the late summer of
to the federal and provincial bunkers
many proposed sites.
1960. In January 1961, Lieutenantfor analysis. In an emergency, the
Rockingham also indicated that
General S.F. Clark, the chief of the
government would use the data to
federal buildings could only house
general staff, directed each command
advise families about relative levels
a fraction of the shelters required for
to begin investigating possible shelter
of safety across the country, prepare
effective reporting in the province.
locations and to open discussions
evacuation orders for areas facing
Provincial or private agencies, such
with provincial agencies and deliver
lethal levels of fallout, and advise
as the national railways, forestry
an early report about proposed
homeowners by radio broadcast
companies, or power generating
locations in their areas of jurisdiction.
about when the most lethal period
firms, would need to be brought in
The directive contained what proved
following an attack ended. (See
to the project. Success depended
to be an optimistic schedule for
Figure 1.) The Army’s study group
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NDFRS sites, to purchase
and install air raid sirens to
expand the attack warning
network, and needed
nearly $4 million worth
of radiation detection
equipment. Clark proposed
to use existing stocks to
supply FRPs with radiation
detection equipment as
soon as possible, so that
the system could obtain
“a limited capability in
about two weeks.” Of
course, doing so meant
stripping radiacmeters
from the Militia and
Regular units tasked with
re-entering bombed cities
to rescue civilians, until
new equipment could be
procured. 20 Taking Clark’s
advice to Cabinet, Harkness
also requested greater
autonomy for the Army’s
Area Commands so that
they could award contracts,
authorize overtime, and take
other measures to ensure
that the NDFRS shelters
could be built quickly. The
Cabinet uneasily agreed
to back the American position over
Berlin, and acted on Harkness’s
suggestions and a range of other
exceptional measures to accelerate
military and civilian planning for
nuclear war. 21
Soon after the Cabinet meeting,
Treasury Board officials gave
advance approval of the military’s
expenditures to purchase equipment,
and, more importantly, allowed
the army headquarters to delegate
authority for construction to the area
commanders.22 As a result, general
officers commanding received
permission to spend as much as
$15,500 to build a Filter Centre,
$6,000 to build a nuclear reporting
post (NUDET), and $700 for each
basic basement shelter built for use
as a fallout reporting post (FRP),
Canadian War Museum 19710261-6423

on these private firms’
interest in committing
their facilities and staff
members to the NDFRS
system. Work on nuclear
detonation reporting posts
appeared to have been
simpler because the military
could in most cases use
its own installations near
target cities.
Finally, Rockingham
identified the system’s
largest flaw. What if
the shelters were built,
but nobody decided to
volunteer to report from
them during an emergency?
Rockingham noted that “it is
unrealistic to expect a man
to operate in a fallout shelter
for 14 days if his family is
also not supplied with a
shelter. Hence these [FRPs]
should be large enough to
accommodate the operator
and his family.”16
Obtaining assistance
from external agencies
would be key to meeting
the system’s schedule for
completion. However, the
military did not have authority
to contact the Canadian National
and Pacific Railways, or begin
preparations for shelters at provincial
sites until July 1961. 17 The pace
changed in August, as superpower
confrontation over access to Berlin
threatened imminent nuclear war. As
the crisis reached its peak, the United
States persuaded its allies to increase
their general military preparedness
and funding for civil defence.18 As
US secretary of state Dean Rusk
explained to nervous allies at the
North Atlantic Council, the measures
were not meant “to rattle the saber,
we propose to show how quickly
it can be drawn from the scabbard
in defence of our obligations and
rights.”19 As the crisis deepened, the
Canadian government scrambled to

Major-General John Rockingham
painted in 1958 by Brenda Bury

increase its military readiness and
accelerated all of its national survival
projects.
Diefenbaker’s Cabinet met five
times in late August to approve
measures that would underscore
Canada’s moral and military support
for the United States and Berlin. At
these meetings, defence minister
Douglas Harkness recommended the
immediate dispersal of food rations,
military vehicle stocks, and emergency
clothing from central warehouses to
depots outside Canadian target
areas. A significant number of
Harkness’s recommendations dealt
with the NDFRS system. Before the
Cabinet meetings, General Clark had
informed Harkness that the Army
required immediate Treasury Board
approval to start construction at
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This map shows all the planned locations of fallout reporting posts in
Manitoba. Each post was assigned a number based on its geographical
reference location.
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considerably more than the $500
Canadian civilians were told would
be sufficient to build a basement
shelter.23 Within these limits, the area
commanders had significant freedom
to use civilian contract labourers to
build the shelters, install equipment,
and purchase needed shelter stocks
locally. The goal of this new “crash
program” was to expand the system

the railways and the RCMP. These
organizations had outposts in farflung locations with access to national
communications networks that, with
some adjustment, could be linked in
to the military signals system. In early
September, Major-General Arthur
Wrinch, DSO&P’s chief planner, met
with the regional heads of Canadian
National, Canadian Pacific, Ontario

be the case in fallout reporting.”25
After consultation with the unions,
the major rail networks agreed in
October to begin building shelters in
their stations under army supervision
and at federal expense.26
Cooperation with other
government departments, including
the RCMP, proved more difficult to
arrange than the railway agreement.

A partial map of the fallout reporting posts completed as of 1963 near
Regina, Saskatchewan. Map developed by author.

as quickly as possible, with the
objective of completing the NDFRS
by January 1962.24
Armed with discretionary
spending powers and additional staff,
the Canadian Army reached out for
cooperation from other national and
provincial agencies. In August 1961,
the Directorate of Survival Operations
and Planning (DSO&P) contacted
key government and private sector
partners to brief them on the NDFRS
project and obtain their assistance.
Two groups were crucial to the
success of the building program:
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Northland Railway, and Quebec
North Shore and Labrador Railway
to gain their cooperation. The rail
executives were concerned about
having to pay “overtime” costs
associated with manning shelters
in their stations during a nuclear
war, but were otherwise supportive.
They noted that unionized staff
members would probably sign on to
staff the fallout shelters because “the
unions had previously cooperated in
aircraft spotting, and took it on with
enthusiasm in spite of the fact that it
involved rather more effort than will

As his colleagues reached out to the
railways, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward
Churchill, the engineering officer
who masterminded construction of
the Diefenbunker and other major
projects, worked with federal and
provincial partners to develop a clear
division of responsibility for building
and maintaining the shelters. The
army would specify which buildings
required shelters, and what type to
build, and would work with local
agencies to find contractors to build
the shelters. After construction was
complete, the local agency would
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Militia recruits practice rescue skills during a course at the Lakeview Armoury in September 1961.

look after the shelter’s maintenance
and would be responsible for staffing
the shelter in wartime. Churchill
suggested that reluctant employees
could be persuaded to volunteer
as radiation monitors because
they would be able to bring their
families into the fallout shelter, and
“the advantages provided to the
individual and his family when he

56
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undertakes this responsibility far
outweigh any inconveniences.”27
Soon after Churchill laid out
his plans, work to complete the
NDFRS quickly began to founder
on the rocks of intergovernmental
and departmental disputes. Central
Command staff officers reported
to headquarters in late October
that, while the Ontario provincial

government had agreed to cooperate
with the NDFRS building program, it
had not passed on information to its
responsible departments. The Army
would have to negotiate with each
department separately to access their
buildings and make arrangements
for local construction, with resulting
months of delay.28 The situation was
not much better in Quebec Command.

8

In Rockingham’s headquarters, the
command engineer complained to
Ottawa that the January deadline
could not be met:
These [local arrangements]
involve so many agencies and the
associated communication problems
are so complex that considerable
negotiating and discussion must
take place before construction can
begin. These, together with the

Courtesy of Metabolic Photography
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inherent delays imposed by winter
construction and the inevitable
loss of time during the Christmas
period, are bound to slow down the
programme.29

Even where federal agencies such
as the RCMP had agreed to cooperate
fully with the Army and build
fallout shelters in its detachment
houses, getting the cooperation of
the detachments themselves proved
difficult. In some cases, shelters could
not be constructed at all. In Western
Command, most of the RCMP
detachments in Alberta operated
from leased private homes. Their
standing orders were to undertake
only short-term rental arrangements.
The Army would therefore need to
reach agreement with the property
owners and obtain reasonable
assurances that the shelter could be
staffed in wartime.30
Not all obstacles to construction
were so reasonable. Major A.J.
Arcand, the officer commanding 12
Works Company, RCE, reported to
Western Command that he had run
into substantial opposition from F
Division RCMP detachments. The
local Mounties objected to shelter
construction in their detachments,
Arcand explained, “in most buildings
this area is already used or it is
intended to use it for workshop area,
storage, exhibit room, clothesdrying
lines or recreation area. The RCMP
are not prepared to give up these
facilities to provide space for a
shelter.”31 Despite orders from RCMP
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The fallout reporting post built beneath a post office in Leduc, Alberta
was disassembled to make room for this work room.

headquarters that “real interference
must be apparent before denying
the use of space,” the army engineers
encountered resistance from local
detachments where construction
would temporarily disrupt work or
otherwise inconvenience employees.32
The problems with getting the
NDFRS underway were not entirely
the result of disagreements with local
agencies. In most cases, construction
stalled because of faulty assumptions
made in area headquarters during the
initial planning for NDFRS sites in
the spring of 1961. At that time, area
commands did their planning from a
map reconnaissance, armed with lists
of DND, government, and railway
properties, to create their rough 45 x
15 mile grid of fallout reporting posts.
Once the funds for construction
began to flow from Treasury Board,
area command engineers directed
personnel to conduct hundreds of site
visits, and negotiate with local staff.
These military engineers assessed
the facilities identified in the map
reconnaissance, sent back sketch
plans to help HQ produce blueprints
and manufacturing specifications,
and identified lists of local contractors

who could build the shelter at each
site.33 Approximately 2,000 sites had
to be assessed across the country, a
large burden on the area command
staff personnel. Despite substantial
efforts by engineering staffs to
complete their site surveys quickly,
they were too few to visit every
site. In Ontario, arranging visits to
some locations proved very difficult,
especially in northern parts of the
province. As Major-General H.A.
Sparling, GOC Central Command,
explained to the quartermastergeneral: “It has not been physically
possible to date to complete the
preliminary staff reconnaissance.
To this date, approximately 75% of
these have been carried out. The main
problem has been in the northern
areas…where many of the recces
have been carried out by air and in
the case of the railways by handcar.”
Sparling accurately predicted that
less than half of the FRPs in his area
could be completed by the January
1962 deadline.34
In some cases, once engineers
arrived on-site, their assessment
revealed that many building
basements were unsuitable to house
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shelters, either due to lack of space
or poor building condition. As a
result, new sites would have to be
selected, or the building would
require an above-ground shelter
at additional cost. In Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick, many of the
railway stations required shelters
located outside the facility. Aboveground shelters could not be built
cheaply in winter. In Newfoundland,
reconnaissance parties had to be flown

into some sites by helicopter. Labour
and materials would also need to be
airlifted to these sites, where winter
construction was impossible, leading
Eastern Command to cancel or defer
construction of 68 FRPs in their
region.35 In western Ontario, a number
of sites had to be abandoned after the
reconnaissance group reported that
no communications links existed in
the building, requiring a new survey
of the area and additional site visits.36

Where shelters could be built, the
costs varied widely depending on the
state of the building and cost of local
labour. Some basement shelters could
be built for less than $100-200, as was
the case for a shelter at one of the
Toronto Area Target Headquarters
in Newmarket, Ontario, but others
could be ten times as much. When
Ontario Provincial Police refused to
build a shelter outside their district
headquarters in Perth, Ontario,

Library and Archives Canada, RG 24 Vol 19436 File 2426-4-2

This blueprint shows the design of a standard fallout shelter for use in RCMP detachments.
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labourers had to excavate a new
basement area underneath a vehicle
garage, at a cost of $2,200. 37 Most
shelters, however, appeared to have
been built for slightly more than the
authorized $700 limit. Each of these
required additional approval from
Army headquarters, leading to yet
longer delays. When Rockingham
requested blanket permission
to authorize the construction of
more expensive shelters in order
to avoid wasting time on seeking
case by case approval from Ottawa,
he was curtly (if accurately) told
that “small increases in price will
substantially increase total costs.”38
The cost of above-ground fallout
shelters was much higher than the
average basement construction.
Above-ground shelters required
additional fallout protection. One
design prepared by the Army Works
Service (AWS) estimated that a
60 square foot shelter designed to
house two people would need to be
surrounded by at least 21 inches of
crushed stone to adequately shield
the occupants from radiation. The
cost of this design was approximately
$2,900 (nearly $23,000 today). 39 In
Jasper National Park, where shelters
were planned in the wilderness,
the cost per shelter sky-rocketed.
Engineers estimated they would need
$14,000 to build three shelters in the
woods. 40 The army solicited bids
from private companies such as the
Butler Manufacturing Company for
pre-fabricated shelters that could be
flown in to remote locations, hoping
for some savings, but the costs were
roughly equivalent to those designed
by the AWS.
By the time many of these
problems became apparent, the
January 1962 deadline had passed.
Nevertheless, the NDFRS system
slowly began to take shape. By mid1962, shelters had been installed
at many of the surveyed sites, and
plans were in place to continue
with additional installations each
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fiscal year. Fortunately, it appeared
that the Canadian government and
the armed forces could afford to
proceed at a more leisurely pace.
The German Democratic Republic
(GDR) did much to resolve the
Berlin crisis in late August 1961 by
building a wall between East and
West Berlin. Though American and
Soviet tanks had a tense standoff
at one of the crossing points into
East Berlin, and the West decried
the GDR’s repressive move, world
leaders privately breathed a sigh of
relief. By late 1961, Berlin was no
longer a flashpoint for conflict.

fell, and, following a rancorous public
dispute with the governor of the Bank
of Canada, Diefenbaker devalued the
Canadian dollar, and implemented
austerity measures to control deficit
spending.43 The Cabinet directed the
Department of National Defence to
make cuts in June 1962. Of the $82
million cut from the defence budget,
the army’s share totalled $29 million.
The NDFRS accordingly fell under
the axe along
with

The Canadian Army procured
thousands of IM-108/PD
radiacmeters like this one
for National Survival issue.
Many were installed in fallout
reporting posts.

The Canadian government
did not completely let down its
guard, however, as work proceeded
on the NDFRS and other, higherprofile national survival programs
such as the Special Militia Training
Plan, an effort to temporarily recruit
100,000 Canadians into the Militia
for a six-week course in rescue and
other civil defence skills.41 A crisis
of a different type did much to
derail hopes to complete the NDFRS
program in 1962.
Since assuming power in 1957,
John Diefenbaker’s government
endured a significant downturn in
the Canadian economy. The postwar
boom slowed in the late 1950s, and by
1961 more than 350,000 Canadians
were unemployed, approximately
7.5 per cent of the work force. The
expanding ranks of unemployed
steadily drained the government’s
limited unemployment insurance
coffers. 42 Canada also suffered a
significant trade deficit with the
United States, importing a billion
dollars’ worth of goods more than it
exported. Confidence in the economy
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other
national
survival
p r o g r a m s , including work
on the national warning system and
the military communications system
meant to connect all the government
bunkers in wartime. A departmental
spending review deferred funds to
construct the 812 remaining FRPs,
NUDET stations, and filter centres
until another fiscal year.44
Major-General Wrinch in DSO&P
responded with some incredulity,
noting that the cuts rendered the
warning and reporting systems noneffective, leaving the military unable
to live up to its responsibilities.
Halting construction on the NDFRS,
he warned, “could lead to a major
increase in loss of life in the event
of an attack.” 45 The budget cuts
effectively crippled the NDFRS.
Despite intergovernmental confusion
and slow progress on construction,
approximately 1,200 FRPs had been
built or were near completion at the
time of the departmental review. In
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order to become operational, however,
these reporting posts needed secure
communications links and equipment
that could effectively gauge radiation
levels, or, in the case of nuclear
detonation posts, the direction and
intensity of nuclear explosions over
Canada. An immediate impact of the
departmental review was the loss of
funds to establish communications
links from the shelters to filter centres
and emergency government bunkers.
Announcing the austerity measures,
Harkness indicated that “rentals of
telephone and teleprinter circuits,
usually a heavy expenditure, will
be restricted.”46 If an attack came,
the government’s ability to map and
predict fallout patterns would be
almost entirely dependent on existing
communications links: railway
telegraph, commercial telephone, or
police radio circuits. As Rockingham
had pointed out in his original
assessment of the NDFRS, because
these communications were routed
through exchanges located in major
target areas, it was very likely that the
entire reporting system could be shut
down in the first stages of an attack
on North America.
Discussing the effects of the
cuts, Harkness also mentioned to
the press that “procurement of
some items would be postponed.”47
This referred to the radiation and
blast detection material that the
FRPs and NUDET posts required
to monitor radiation levels. The
original design requirements of
the FRP called for the installation
of the IM-5015/TD, a radiacmeter
that could be safely monitored from
within the shelter, linked to a probe
attached outdoors. By the time of
the 1961 crisis over Berlin and the
crash program, the Canadian Army
had few of these meters. Instead,
they distributed stocks of the handheld IM-108/TD radiacmeters as
“interim meters” until sufficient
5015s could be purchased to equip
the far-flung reporting outposts.48
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While the official scales of issue for
each FRP and NUDET post called
for one 5015 set, the records indicate
that the hand-held radiacmeters were
the best that volunteer operators ever
received.49 One of the key attractions
of the NDFRS was that volunteers
could share the shelter with their
families, offering some promise of
safety in a post-attack environment.
Without the remote-reading meter,
the risks of contaminating the
shelter and killing the occupants
increased exponentially. Every
time the occupant took a reading,
he or she would have to turn on
the meter, zero it, don protective
equipment, and then venture outside
the shelter to gauge radiation levels.
The army’s revised instructions for
fallout reporting using hand-held
equipment did not inspire confidence:
“One minute, even 30 seconds, is a
relatively long time, the exposure
should be reduced to a minimum
by rehearsing action before going
outside…”50 Considering that FRPs
were required to report each hour,
each outing meant increased risks
of radiation sickness, more water
lost to decontaminating equipment
and clothing, and greater risks of
contaminating the shelter itself.
The 5015 sets eventually came into
the Canadian Army’s inventory,
but records indicate that none were
installed in shelters by the end of
1962.51
By the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962,
the Canadian Army had built more
than half of the facilities required
for the NDFRS, but these basic
shelters lacked essential equipment
or reliable communications. Had a
war occurred, it is very likely that
the shelters might have saved some
lives, but their greater value to the
government of Canada as a tool
to advise Canadian citizens about
fallout patterns would have been
severely limited. Fortunately for all
involved, the Cuban crisis passed

without significant incident, and the
shelters were not manned at any point
during the standoff in the Caribbean.
In the denouement of the crisis, work
continued on the NDFRS at a slower
pace, even though army officials close
to the program privately argued that
the urgency to complete the program
was “greater, not less, than it was the
last summer.”52
By 1963, the Canadian
government and, by extension,
the armed forces, had begun to
move away from civil defence and
national survival preparations. The
government shifted responsibility
for emergency measures to the
Department of Defence Production,
preferring to focus on plans for
natural disasters rather than nuclear
war. The Army, meanwhile, happily
if quietly divested itself of many of
its domestic responsibilities in favour
of conventional war preparations
overseas. The military retained
control of the warning sirens, the
Diefenbunker, and other provincial
and regional emergency government
headquarters. The NDFRS did not
appear to survive this reorganization.
The federal government transferred
control of some shelters to provincial
emergency measures agencies, to the
railways, or to local authorities who
wanted them.53 In 1967, Canadian
Army personnel toured command
districts to retrieve communications
and radiac equipment from
the unused shelters, effectively
dismantling the fallout reporting
posts.54
From 1959 to 1963, the Canadian
Army engaged in a national project
to build fallout shelters designed to
collect and transmit information on
the fallout that would blanket the
country following a nuclear attack.
The shelter-building experience
highlights a central problem that
plagued both civilian and military
efforts to improve the country’s
passive defences against nuclear war.
Interagency and interdepartmental
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bureaucratic confusion slowed the
implementation of policy, even
in an emergency situation, while
fiscal support to the project proved
fleeting. Like the public, the military
was forced to make its preparations
with an imperfect and ultimately
incomplete warning system. The
military’s frustrated efforts to
construct a mere 2,000 shelters goes
some distance to prove that building
shelters was not as easy as had
been advertised to the public in
government pamphlets such as Your
Basement Fallout Shelter. Working from
nearly identical designs, the military
found that costs often exceeded their
own generous estimates, which were
higher than the $500 Canadians were
told such structures would cost.
More importantly, army engineers
discovered that building basement
shelters in rural municipalities
proved more difficult than they had
expected. Their discovery highlights
some of the flaws in the fallout
strategy as a whole, for it was in the
countryside that the population was
told to seek shelter. Most interesting
of all is the fact that the army’s
shelter output during the period
in question was virtually equal to
the reported 2,000 family fallout
shelters built by the public during
these years. Ultimately, the NDFRS
was an ambitious but deeply flawed
aspect of the Canadian Army’s
national survival program. It was
carried out for no other reason than,
like much of Canada’s preparations
for nuclear war, an imperfect plan
was better than nothing. Most of the
NDFRS is gone. As railway stations
closed, as RCMP and provincial
police detachments moved from
leased private housing to purposebuilt facilities, the shelters were left
behind. Without maintenance, some
flooded. More often, the shelters
were destroyed to make room for
new construction, or filled in and
buried to save costs. In Meath Park,
Saskatchewan, the FRP was buried
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when the CPR station was relocated
and the building renovated to become
a diner. An extensive survey would
be required to determine how many
of the FRPs and other facilities still
survive. The author has uncovered
several shelters scattered through
rural areas, in some cases where the
original building was preserved as
a historic site.55 What little remains
of the NDFRS today, however, is
physical evidence of the extent of
nuclear war planning and how it
touched many communities across
Canada.
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